

# **National Intelligence Daily**

Wednesday 12 October 1983

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
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	SOUTH KOREA-NORTH KOREA: Further Reactions to Bombing	
<b>ę</b>	Growing conviction in South Korea that North Korea was responsible for the bombing incident in Rangoon on Sunday may increase pressure on President Chun to retaliate, but his options are limited by broader security concerns.	· 25X
î		
	the President ask for one. Outrage over the incident is high among	25X1
	South Korean military personnel and the public.	25X1
		25X1
	North Korean clandestine radiobroadcasts tie the attack to an unspecified "dissident group" and have repeated earlier warnings—which they attribute to "South Korean	25X1
	dissidents"—that President Reagan will face "stern punishment" if he visits Seoul.	25X1
	Meanwhile, Rangoon announced yesterday that authorities had captured one Korean terrorist, killed another, and were searching for a third.	25X
		25X1
	Comment: As indications of North Korean involvement build, Chun may feel the need to retaliate in some way to maintain	29/()
	confidence in his leadership. He has little room to maneuver, however, and he almost certainly recognizes that direct retaliation could escalate into open conflict.	25X1
•	In addition, Chun's actions are likely to be tempered by his desire not to cause postponement of President Reagan's visit, scheduled for next month. The visit has now become of even greater importance to	
	Chun as a sign of Washington's long-term security commitment to Seoul.	25X1
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	NICARAGUA: Port Attacked	
	The government summoned the diplomatic corps yesterday t report on the insurgent attack Monday against the port of Corinto.	
ę a	The Nicaraguan Democratic Force publicly claimed credit for attack yesterday.	r the 25X1 25X1
	Red Cross off stated that three sailors aboard a South Korean tanker were amount to be stated.	ong
	Comment: The extent of the damage at Corinto is uncertain unusual summoning of the diplomatic corps probably prepares t way to protest that the insurgents are attacking Nicaragua's economy. The incident may influence Managua to reverse its ear decision to defer discussion of Central America at the UN Gener	lier

25X1

#### **LEBANON: Problems for Peace Efforts**

The Gemayel government and opposition factions continue to disagree on where to hold national reconciliation talks, and the 25X1 Lebanese Army's Druze Chief of Staff may be preparing to resign. Despite optimistic press reports over the weekend, Druze leader Walid Junblatt yesterday vetoed the presidential palace as a site for reconciliation talks. The government rejected Junblatt's proposal that 25X1 the talks be held on a Greek ship off the Lebanese coast. All factions had agreed to accept several hundred Greek and Italian troops as cease-fire observers. The Druze militia insisted yesterday, however, that a final decision be delayed until other unspecified countries can consider sending observers. 25X1 General Nadim al-Hakim, the highest-ranking Druze in the Lebanese Army, announced from a Druze stronghold in the Shuf yesterday that he will meet with Junblatt soon and will then decide whether to resign from the Army. Hakim threatened to resign early last month following rumors of a massacre of Druze civilians in Kafr Matta, a town in the Shuf, by Lebanese Army personnel. 25X1 **Comment:** The current deadlock reflects the tensions underlying the negotiations. Even if reconciliation talks can be arranged, little common ground exists between the government's position and 25X1 opposition demands. General Hakim's resignation might encourage the remainder of the Army's 1,100 Druze officers and soldiers to resign or desert, but the impact on the Army's effectiveness is likely to be small. Although the position of Chief of Staff is traditionally held by a Druze, Army Commander Tannous might take the opportunity to improve his relations with the Shia community by replacing Hakim with the senior 25X1 Shia officer, Brigadier General Abbas Hamdan.

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			25 <b>X</b> 1
	ISRAEL: New Austerity Measures		
	The measures announced by the Israeli cabinet yesterd		
ু হ	the recent run on the dollar will cause inflation to increase levels.	to recora	25X1
r	The measures included an 18.6-percent devaluation of and price increases on most government-controlled items, bread and milk, by 50 percent. A plan was approved to pro-	, including	
	holders of bank shares if they will agree to hold the assets years.		25X1
	Finance Minister Aridor publicly stated his intention eigengetiate an agreement with Histadrut, the large labor org to limit the cost-of-living adjustment or to impose a limit he Histadrut has announced a two-hour strike tomorrow.	anization,	25X1
	Comment: The cabinet was forced to take action by the rush to buy US dollars last week in anticipation of a devalual Israelis sold stocks, particularly bank shares, for shekels to dollars, precipitating a crash in the stock market and forci closure for a week. Recent press reports citing rising foreign declining foreign exchange reserves contributed to the rundalism.	ation. Many sell for US ng its In debt and	25X1
	The immediate impact of the new measures will be high	her prices.	25 <b>X</b> 1
·	which will result in a record inflation this year. If Aridor does succeed in limiting cost-of-living adjustments, much of the these steps will be mitigated in January, when wages and	es not impact of	
	are adjusted for inflation.  Public reaction to the measures appears to be moderated as a second sec		25X1

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stringency. Public support for the Shamir government's economic policies probably will begin to erode as the price hikes spread through the economy, particularly if cost-of-living adjustments are not

sufficient to compensate for higher prices.

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#### **PALESTINIANS: Rebels' Political Offensive**

Fatah dissidents have begun a political campaign to force PLO chairman Arafat to accept their preeminence in the organization.	<sup>-</sup> 25X1
Rebel military leader Said Maragha and political leader Nimr Salih claim that a majority of Fatah members now support their movement. Salih on Saturday convened a meeting in Damascus of the heads of the PLO's constituent groups, including key leaders George Habbash and Naif Hawatmah, who have tried to mediate the Fatah dispute. Salih announced that more meetings would be held to discuss the formation of a collective leadership for the PLO.	25X1
The dissidents have emphasized recent defections to their ranks as an indication of their growing strength. During the past week 30 Fatah officers stationed in the Bekaa Valley and additional Fatah personnel in Syria have joined them.	25X1
The rebels have taken over most of the Fatah offices in Damascus, a move that resulted in fighting on Monday between them and forces loyal to Arafat. The two sides also clashed that day in northern Lebanon.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: The continued erosion of Arafat's support probably has convinced the dissident leaders that they now have sufficient influence to force the PLO chairman's removal, if he continues to resist their demands for more militant policies and closer alignment with Syria. Salih has increased his prestige and legitimacy by convening the PLO leaders in Damascus. Habbash and Hawatmah probably continue to argue in favor of keeping Arafat as at least a symbolic leader, but their attendance indicates their increasing	
Arafat's recent statements calling for renewed dialogue with Jordan will increase his political isolation in Fatah. They could also provide a pretext for a Syrian move against his forces in Lebanon.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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### **USSR: Gas Pipeline Developments**

Moscow has announced that the Soviet minister responsible for overseeing the construction of the gas export pipeline to Western Europe has been named a Hero of Socialist Labor, because the	
pipeline has been completed ahead of schedule.	25 <b>X</b> 1
the	25X
pipeline is not ready for full-scale operation. the Soviets may use domestic pipelines parallel to the export pipeline to transport	25X
the Soviets will be capable within the next three or four months of delivering up to 9 billion cubic meters annually, using spare capacity	25X
from the domestic pipeline network to supplement the export pipeline.	25X1
	25X1
Comment: The announcement is part of the Soviet propaganda effort to flaunt the pipeline progress despite US sanctions. The USSR is likely to have little difficulty in meeting initial export commitments to Western Europe in 1984. Although construction of some compressor stations probably is lagging behind schedule, enough power presumably will be on line to meet these initial commitments using	
only the export pipeline.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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
#### **USSR-BOLIVIA: Soviets Seek Closer Ties**

Moscow is trying to increase its influence in Bolivia by offering military aid and expanded commercial ties.	25X
	25X
A Soviet-Bolivian commission recently authorized Soviet construction of a tractor assembly plant and technical assistance in	
energy, mining, and other fields. It endorsed new efforts in tin- processing ventures that are being financed with a Soviet line of	
credit of at least \$100 million. Bolivia also has agreed to allow Aeroflot to open an office, although no agreement has been reached on air services.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: Moscow has sought to expand ties throughout South America since the conflict in the Falkland Islands but has made little	
headway as a result of local suspicion of Soviet motives. It probably hopes that the year-old leftist government in Bolivia under President	
Siles will be more willing than its military predecessors to permit a greater Soviet presence.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The USSR apparently sees Bolivia as a key country from which to	
try to influence its neighbors. Siles, however, probably will limit new Soviet ties in deference to the US and the concerns of the anti-	
Communist Bolivian armed forces.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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	DENMARK: Election Possible	•
	Increasing opposition to Prime Minister Schlueter's economic program could bring down the center-right minority coalition this	
	month. The centrist Radical Liberal Party and the rightwing Progress Party, both of which have to vote with Schlueter to pass economic legislation, are arguing against budget cutbacks, especially in areas	
	of social welfare. Schlueter said in his opening speech to the parliament on 4 October that the government would stand or fall on	
	four major economic issues. They are public spending cuts, a revised personal income tax system, higher health insurance premiums, and	05.74
•	increased contributions to unemployment funds.	25 <b>X</b> 1
î	Comment: The current four-party coalition could retain power in an election based purely on economic issues. Schlueter's Conservatives probably would almost double their seats, although at	•
÷	the expense of the smaller partners. An election and possible delays in putting together a new government might divert the socialist parties	
	from their attempts to soften the Danish position on INF at least until after the initial deployments in December.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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# **Special Analysis**

## **ISRAEL: Prospects for the Shamir Government**

Prime Minister Shamir probably will find it hard to preserve the cohesion and stability of the government he has inherited. He will have to expend considerable energy trying to keep peace among the components of the Likud-dominated coalition that are in conflict over patronage and policy, especially on urgent economic issues. Moreover, he will have to mediate among the younger Herut Party leaders, who are competing for the leadership of the party. Shamir shares many of former Prime Minister Begin's hardline political views and generally will keep to the policy course set by his predecessor in both domestic and foreign affairs.

25**X**1

The fractious coalition hitherto has been held together by Begin's force of character. Begin's alliance with the religious parties, for example, was forged on the basis of his personal commitment to religious values that are as important to the National Religious Party as to the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel. Shamir is not seen to have the same commitment.

25X1

Media reports indicate leaders of the National Religious Party are concerned about the decline in their party's electoral support during the period it has been aligned with Likud. Moreover, they are having misgivings about the coalition's stability following Begin's departure.

25X1

The TAMI Party, which draws support from economically depressed Sephardi Jews, is objecting to budget measures adopted last August that it believes hurt its constituency. The party also is angry over the treatment of its leader, Aharon Abu Hatzeira, who is serving a brief sentence for embezzlement.

25X1

Shamir will have to devote special attention to containing the feud between the Herut and Liberal Parties. According to the US Embassy, Liberal politicians are taking seriously newspaper reports that Herut now wants to scrap its agreement of 1965 with the Liberal Party forming the Likud parliamentary alliance. The media say the party wants to reduce the Liberals' representation in the Knesset and cabinet to bring it more in line with their electoral support.

25X1

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	Challenges for the Leadership		
	·	ominance among his	
e. 7	Because Shamir has yet to establish his predecabinet peers, he presumably will govern by consministers and potential rivals—Deputy Prime Min Minister Arens, Finance Minister Aridor, and postwithout Portfolio Sharon—will play important rol delegate broad responsibility to his senior colleatime attempting to win over his rivals or play ther other.	sensus. His senior hister Levy, Defense sibly Minister es. Shamir will gues, at the same	25X1
	Chamir unlika Basin is uncomfortable with r	anacrous	
	Shamir, unlike Begin, is uncomfortable with r confrontation. As Prime Minister, he will be more but he probably will remain firm on important po	flexible tactically,	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Despite Shamir's selection as Herut leader, to battle within the party has yet to begin. Shamir is in Israel as an interim leader who will serve until generation of new leaders is ready to take over.	generally regarded	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Shamir does not have widespread support an and-file membership or among Israel's Sephardi provided Begin with a solid foundation of suppor probably will be complicated by maneuvering amambitious Herut leaders aspiring to his job, David	community, which t. His administration ong younger,	
	ambitious herut leaders aspiring to his job, David	a Levy III particular.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	In the past, when Begin's coalition partners of they were careful not to bring the government do a vote of confidence. They were well aware of Be popularity. Shamir does not wield such powerful and the instinct for survival in office probably will keep the coalition together, barring some nations coalesce the government.	own by deserting it in egin's enormous political leverage, I not be sufficient to	25X1
· ·	The coalition is likely to break up next year. I of going to the polls with a leader who lacks a strollowing, the younger Herut leaders—Levy, Arer possibly former Defense Minister Weizman—can challenge Shamir for the party leadership. The coalled together by the force of his personal magnet probably divide its loyalties among several of the	rong personal ns, Sharon, and be expected to constituency Begin tism, meanwhile, will	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Labor Party Encouraged		
	The opposition Labor Party's prospects for r have been considerably enhanced by events. Fol resignation, party chairman Peres and former Pr have patched over their differences, in an effort t viable political force.	lowing Begin's ime Minister Rabin	25X1
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	14	12 October 1983	25 <b>X</b> ′

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	New parliamentary elections, however, would test the Labor Party's fragile unity. The party is hampered by its failure to make the structural and ideological changes necessary to restore public confidence in it and its leadership.	25 <b>X</b> 1
es.	Implications for the US	
ş	Shamir, whose service as Foreign Minister under Begin made him more sensitive to the importance of relations with the US, will try to maintain the good climate in US-Israeli relations that has developed over the past year. He is retaining Arens—the Begin government's most outspoken advocate of close ties with the US—as Minister of Defense.	25X1
	The Shamir government is unlikely to make substantial policy changes, however, in matters where there were important differences between the US and Israel under Begin. These include President Reagan's peace plan and the handling of the West Bank.	25X1

25X1

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